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Abssttrracctt:: This paper shows how land and wealth are linked in Namibia. Historical examples of how white, commercial landowners used favourable economic, legal, and
political conditions to make profit from land show how this accumulation of capital has been, to this day, a hindrance to a more equal society. Since Namibia’s
independence in 1990, new and diverse ways of assigning value to land have also emerged on communal land in circumstances of growing market competition. In short,
we will show how past and present developments in Namibia created opportunities to make money out of land, leading to the accumulation of wealth in the hands of a
few.
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INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we discuss how land and wealth are linked in Namibia. More specifically, we argue that commercialised land reform in Namibia focused only on
the redistribution of land, and did not consider the wealth that landowners made from land before it became part of the reform programme (Hall  2009). In the
second part of the paper, we show that current developments with respect to communal lands have not thus far led to a redistribution of wealth. Access to land
remains important in many countries with poorly developed industries and limited access to income-generating activities.  Redistribution therefore remains
important in addressing the historical injustice of land dispossession and the current racial distribution of land ownership (Cousins and Scoones 2010). We argue
that generalised assumptions about the value of land often blur discussions of equity. Equity can only be achieved if the redistribution of land comes together
with a change in “patterns of investment (capital),  productive land use (land) and employment (labour)” (Hall  2009).  As Harold Wolpe  (1972) argues, the
history of land dispossession is also the history of capital accumulation and exploitation of labour.
We first discuss historical and current examples of how white commercial landowners used favourable economic, legal, and political conditions to profit from
land. We argue that this pattern of accumulation continues to be a hindrance to a more equal Namibian society. We then turn our attention to communal land,
which has come under growing commercialisation since Namibia’s independence in 1990, owing to the integration of communal land into the wider economy.
The justification for such integration was that it would create better income-generating opportunities for the people living on such land. New and diverse ways
of assigning value to communal land have emerged; these are different from the methods that were in existence when land use was characterised by subsistence
or peasant production (Nghitevelekwa  2020).  The  processes  of  commodification of  communal  land are  now apparent  (Nghitevelekwa,  forthcoming).  The
contexts that we present in this article show that reforms and the engagement with the land question do not sufficiently consider the diversity of forms of land
use and the possibilities of making money from land, whether in the past or at present.
While the link between land ownership and wealth accumulation has been well established in many historical and geographical contexts (for a recent overview
on the African debate see Chitonge and Mine 2019), there are some specificities about these processes in Namibia. Land dispossession in Namibia happened
relatively recently, just over a hundred years ago, and is therefore still a political and emotional issue, especially in a context in which most of those who lost
their land remain poor, while other income-generating activities are either insecure or unavailable. The particular climatic, economic, and historical conditions
in Namibia have made most of the land economically unprofitable, or profitable only with high government support and cheap labour (historically) and/or with
private investment and favourable legal contexts in more recent times. As a consequence, the extent of land possession is an insufficient indicator of wealth and
power.  The  basic  factors  that  underlie  the  potential  profitability  of  land  are  its  geographical  and  agro-ecological  status.  Other  factors  include  access  to
technology and knowledge, existing infrastructure, a favourable legal and political situation (which includes access to subsidies),  and capital investment in
productive enterprises such as agricultural marketing enterprises (Odendaal 2005, Cousins and Scoones 2010, p. 60).
To understand the specific conditions that led to the current land distribution pattern in Namibia, we first provide a historical overview of land dispossession and
accumulation during colonial and apartheid times. We then discuss the current situation and the debate around land rights and land reform. To develop our
central point, which is that the context in which land generates wealth, whether in the past or present, is crucial to the discussion of land and land reform in
Namibia, we will discuss three such contexts. These are conservation and tourism, housing estates, and the current dynamics of making money on and with
communal lands. In short,  we will  show how past and present developments in Namibia created opportunities to make money out of land, leading to the
accumulation of wealth in the hands of a few. We therefore argue that to be effective, redistributive land reform would have to consider these specific features of
owning and controlling land.
DISPOSSESSION AND COLONIAL APPROPRIATION OF LAND
In the mid-19th century, the territory that later became Namibia was roughly divided between two different forms of production and land use. In the far north,
settled agriculture in combination with cattle-keeping was predominant. In these areas relatively strong and centralised political entities developed (Hayes
1992 ). To the south, in the arid areas, people mostly relied on a pastoral system with very high mobility and no fixed boundaries between different entities
(Werner 1993). The two systems were not based on private land ownership, but on user rights over grazing, cultivating, harvesting or hunting. It was during this
time that European missionaries and traders, and settlers from the Cape, became more influential in using and trading land and resources in southern Namibia
(Wallace 2011, pp. 46-47).
The process of formal land dispossession through European agency started in 1883 when the German businessman Adolf Lüderitz, a trader in weapons and
other goods, acquired large stretches of land for the purpose of mining. Within a few years, large parts of southern and central Namibia fell under private
German concession companies. Although these concessions were not directly followed by an actual colonisation of the land, they allowed colonial Germany,
which had acquired Namibia as its “protectorate” in 1884, to consolidate German authority (Wallace 2011, p. 117). In the mid-1890s, the fear of rinderpest
entering the region from the north led to the establishment of a temporary “veterinary border” that was marked by a series of newly erected police posts to seal
off the northern areas of the colony from the southern areas. The border could not prevent rinderpest cattle disease from spreading to the south; however, the
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Line”  (Miescher  2012). During the Namibian War and the genocide (1904-1908), most of the areas south of this border were turned into the so-called Police
Zone, to be under police protection as a potential settler farm economy (Miescher  2012, pp. 23-25).
There were several events around the turn of the 19th century that accelerated European land acquisition. In 1897 the territory was hit by a severe outbreak of
the rinderpest epizootic, killing large numbers of livestock, impoverishing local farmers, and bringing dramatic changes to the power structure of the colony
(Miescher  2012, pp. 19-42). This epizootic has often been described as the beginning of a process of gradual land dispossession by the colonisers (Werner 1993,
Marquardt  2007, and Miescher  2012).  The  genocidal  war  (1904-1908)  that  followed largely  destroyed  all  remaining  local  access  to  livestock  and land  in
southern and central Namibia. After the genocide, the colonial administration issued regulations to expropriate all so-called “tribal land,” thus disallowing land
ownership by Africans.  The beginning of the First World War marked the end of German colonial rule. With this the process of land dispossession in central
and southern Namibia was nearly complete. The few exceptions were so-called “native reserves,” located mainly around Rehoboth and in the far south, which
were established as labour reserves (Moore  2021). On the other hand, white settlements north of the Red Line, where the majority of Namibia’s population
lived, were prohibited, and existing white farms resettled inside the Police Zone with the aim of establishing an exclusive African labour reserve governed
through a system of indirect rule (Miescher  2012).
This did not yet mean that all the farms inside the Police Zone were already allocated to white farmers, but by the end of German colonial rule in 1915, around
1500 white farmers and their families had been allocated 35 per cent of the land intended for white settlement (the rest was Crown land). These families owned
over 90 per cent of the cattle in the Police Zone. To run their farms, they relied on about 12,500 labourers who came mainly from the north of the Red Line
(Werner 1993, p. 140). What is important here is that the loss of land by people in the Police Zone and the genocide of the early 20th century was accompanied
by a growing need among people in the North (outside of the Police Zone) to find wage labour, as they had lost their cattle during the rinderpest outbreak. The
North thus became an important labour reserve, particularly because the genocide had led to a labour shortage in the Police Zone.
With the conquest of Namibia in 1915 by troops of the South African Union, German colonial rule ended. Under the subsequent years of military rule, no
permanent allocation or  alienation of  land was allowed,  which gave some space for  Black herders to re-pastoralise  abandoned or  not-yet-allocated farms
(Miescher  2012). This came to an end in 1920, when South Africa was granted the mandate over Namibia by the League of Nations, and South Africa’s land
legislation supporting white settlement was implemented (Werner 1993). The South African government started a programme to allocate farms to poor whites
from South Africa, either in the form of long-term leases with the option to purchase the land at the end of the lease, or in the form of short-term grazing
licenses.  Farmers were also provided state financial  support.  Cheap labour (from northern Namibia,  but also from small  reserves within the Police Zone),
guaranteed land rights for farmers, and the growing support extended by the government led to a rapid expansion of farmlands owned by whites throughout the
Police Zone (Werner 1993, p. 146).
After World War II, the South African administration appointed the Lardner-Burke Commission to assess the conditions of white settlers within the Police Zone
and develop a policy to address the growing need of white settlers for farmland. The Commission suggested an extension of the Police Zone and the surveying
of new farms on the edges of the Zone. The idea was that every white farming family had to be provided with enough land to allow for a sustainable income.
Poor whites living on farms were expected to find employment elsewhere, and farmers who only had grazing rights on farms were pushed into leasing or buying
farms, or leaving the land. With these extensions of farmlands, the remaining Africans were pushed even further out of productive lands (Miescher  2012,
pp.138-141).  The expansion of white-owned farmland that followed exceeded the recommendations of the Lardner-Burke Commission. By 1964 there were
7000  farms  under  white  settlement,  a  staggering  80  per  cent  increase  in  the  period  after  1945.  This  expansion  of  the  colonial  farming  economy  was
accompanied by a massive increase in the density of land use, and a growing pressure on and overexploitation of ecological resources (Miescher  2012).
This expansion came to a halt in the early 1960s. By this time most of the land in the Police Zone was white-owned farmland. Apartheid South Africa’s vision
of a completely racially segregated social system was further strengthened with the establishment in 1962 of the Commission of Enquiry into South West Africa
Affairs, better known as the Odendaal Commission. This would lead to the final phase of forced removals of residents – almost entirely black – as also to a shift
in colonial settlement policies.
The consequences of the Odendaal Commission were different for people north of the Red Line in the communal lands, and those in the Police Zone. All areas
in the North were foreseen by Odendaal to become homelands similar to the South African homelands. Some of the homelands became pseudo-independent
states, ruled mostly by traditional authorities and controlled by South Africa. Others remained directly administered from Windhoek or Pretoria. The specific
administrative arrangement in these homelands notwithstanding, they were all subject to the rule that private land ownership would not be allowed, and that
they would function mainly as labour reserves for the white economy in the south and in South Africa.
The Odendaal Plan had direct consequences for people in the Police Zone. The former reserves, once scattered all over the Police Zone, were consolidated and
expanded  into  contiguous  territorial  entities.  The  government  did  this  by  buying  some  farms  and  by  “deproclaiming”  conservation  areas.  These  newly
established territorial entities served as the basis for the creation of ethnically defined homelands. As a result of territorial reordering, the percentage of land
reserved for the African population grew from 24 per cent to 40 per cent. Most of this land, however, was situated in desert or semi-desert areas. (Miescher
2012 ,  pp.  285-287  and  Du  Pisani  1986,  pp.  59-172).  The  Odendaal  Commission  report  led  to  even  more  intensified  support  for  white  farmers.  New
infrastructure, such as dams to provide hydro-electricity, was created, and investments made in agricultural technology. This led to some white-owned farms
becoming profitable businesses. Businesses that developed on state (formerly Crown) land, where private companies were allotted mining concessions, became
even more profitable. Exploitation of the workers from the north and the reserves was the basis of these economic developments (Quinn 2021; Amupanda 2020;
Wallace  2011 and Moorsom  1977).  There was some dilution of racially-based legislation on land ownership in the 1980s. Nevertheless,  the landownership
pattern that was introduced during colonial time and built upon by the apartheid regime, and with it the extreme inequality of land and wealth distribution
(Wallace 2011, p. 301) remained intact, at least until Namibia’s national independence in 1990. Many aspects of that inequality exist even today.
LAND TENURE SYSTEMS AND LAND REFORMS
The process we have described above led to a dual land tenure system. Setting aside state land (e.g. conservation areas) and town lands, Namibia is divided into
commercial land, which is largely owned by the white population, and communal land, on which a majority of the black population lives and ekes out a living.
The two areas are administered under different tenurial systems: freehold tenure for the former and customary tenure for the latter. The key differences between
the two different tenure systems in Namibia (freehold and communal) relate to the right to use, the right to transfer or sell, and the right to derive income from
land (Nghitevelekwa  2020). The rights granted on communal land include customary land rights, rights of leasehold and rights of occupation of land. The two
land systems are also different in respect of the degree of formalisation and security of tenure. While commercial land has full titled rights (title deeds and
transfer rights), communal land is owned by the state but administered by the respective customary authorities who are responsible for the allocation of land
rights (Nghitevelekwa,  2020). In addition, land rights allocated by the customary authorities are registered by the Communal Land Boards, an institution that
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People holding freehold or commercial land have the full bundle of property rights attached to it; they are able to sell land and use all its resources (except for
mining rights, which remain with the state). Freehold land rights were mainly acquired during colonial and apartheid times. Since Independence, and beginning
with the first National Land Conference in 1991, efforts to redistribute this land are ongoing and are under what is called the Commercial Land Reform (Werner
and Kruger 2007, Melber  2019). The Commercial Land Reform aims at the redistribution of farmland occupied by white farmers to formerly disadvantaged
groups, based on a “willing seller, willing buyer” principle. Redistribution takes place through two processes, the National Resettlement Programme and the
Affirmative Action Loan Scheme. In the former,  the state buys land from willing sellers and thereafter redistributes it  to people in the form of leaseholds
(Werner et  al.  2010). Through this process the state acquires private land but alienates only leasehold rights to people, thus denying them the full bundle of
property rights.  The Affirmative Action Loan Scheme is managed by the Agricultural Bank of Namibia,  through which the beneficiaries acquire subsidised
loans to buy land at market prices. The eligibility criteria are as follows: “The applicant must have a minimum of 150 large stock or 800 small stock or own
productive livestock equivalent to at least 35 per cent official carrying capacity of the farm which he or she intends purchasing, or have the financial capacity to
purchase  such livestock.”  Landowners who have acquired land through the Affirmative Action Scheme keep full private property rights or freehold rights with
title deeds.
The current debate on the land question covers a range of issues. In request of the freehold land reform, which aims to bring about redistributive justice, the
discourse centres on addressing the historical injustice resulting from colonial land dispossession. The commercial land reform is under criticism for being too
slow (Werner 2018a). Widespread dissatisfaction with the commercial land reform led to a call for a second National Land Conference. This finally took place
in 2018. A report published on the eve of the conference showed that even 30 years after Independence, 86 per cent of what was commercial farmland is still
under private ownership. Of this, 70 per cent remains in the possession of the white population, while the formerly disadvantaged population owns just 16 per
cent. The remaining 14 per cent has been bought by the state for resettlement farms (Namibia Statistics Agency 2018). The data clearly reflect the perpetuation
of racial inequalities in land distribution. Commercial land reform has also been criticised for not targeting the people that are in need, and for being directed to
the advantage of the political and economic elite (Iikela  2018). Another point of contention in respect of the redistributive land reform is the recognition of
ancestral land rights for communities that were dispossessed of their lands in colonial times. These discussions led to the establishment of the Commission  of
Ancestral  Land Rights  and Restitution,  2020, to study claims of ancestral land rights. Further, questions about the economic viability of land redistributed
through the resettlement programme have been raised (Werner and Odendaal 2010).
It is not only the redistribution of commercial land that has been the subject of intense debate. Important issues relating to communal land also took centrestage
in Namibia's land politics. To follow the dynamics of the current debate on communal land, the complex system of land use and access that characterise such
land must be understood. Communal land is divided into land that has been alienated to individual households and the so-called “commonages” or pastures for
grazing. Land can be given to an individual in the form of a customary right of occupation for subsistence farming; in the form of leasehold rights for business
or commercial purposes;  or in the form of occupational rights (for example,  schools and churches).  While land that has been thus given to an individual
household can today be registered in order to secure statutory rights, there is thus far no legal process in the communal land reform system that allows for the
registration of commonages. A key consequence of the lack of statutory rights over commonages is that they have become vulnerable to what Odendaal calls
“elite land-grabbing” (Odendaal 2011). While granting customary land rights has been hailed as a right step in the direction of bringing about tenure security for
the majority in the communal areas, loopholes in the legislation have allowed the private appropriation of commonages (Peters 2013; Nghitevelekwa  2020).
In Namibia, calls to assign full property rights (including full transfer rights, which are essential for the commercialisation of land) to communal lands have also
been raised by people living on communal land. These calls are linked to the neoliberal narrative of “unlocking the economic potential of communal land,”
which prompts the question of whether providing tradable rights in the communal areas can help in achieving this goal (Nghitevelekwa  2020; also see Research
Department of the Bank of Namibia 2012). Such discussions are in line with Hernando de Soto’s (2001) argument about the need to privatise land in order to
unlock what he calls “dead capital.” He was referring to the fact that use-rights are not sufficient for people to get loans, and are furthermore discouraging
people from making investments on their land. Such arguments are often countered by the view that communal land is a multi-faceted safety net, especially for
the rural poor, providing them a place to live and earn at least a minimum living, even during periods of unemployment, or after retirement (Bloemertz  et al.
2021 ).  Opening it  up  to  a  market  system will  only  perpetuate  inequalities  in  access  to  land.  To prevent  such developments,  the  communal  land reform
programme in Namibia is  focusing on formalising land rights  through registration of  such rights  with the state,  as  well  as  through the establishment of
communal land boards, where traditional authorities come together with the state administration to ratify the attribution of land rights. However, the impact of
the communal land reform on local power structures is complex and has led to a run on not-yet-assigned land parcels in the commonages. Further, while selling
or trading land is prohibited (as people only get use-rights and not transfer-rights), informal land sales are still taking place.
MAKING MONEY FROM LAND
In the following sections, we present three different contexts in which access to land was (and still is) used to make profits, even though agriculture per se is no
longer profitable. These past and recent developments have led to the perpetuation of land concentration and wealth in the hands of a few.
Conservation and Tourism
As described above, the dispossession of people from the land and the exploitation of labour and natural resources constituted the core of the colonial and later
apartheid economic and political  systems.  Crucial  to this  system was the massive subsidisation of  white farmers by the German and later  South African
occupiers who had expropriated the land from the local population. For farms to become productive and profitable, white farm owners were supported directly
(for example with fencing subsidies), and indirectly, by a system that supplied them with cheap disenfranchised labour. Thus, an infrastructure based on the
needs of the white farmer community was established. Further, ownership or user rights over the farm were increasingly extended to everything that was on the
land. This allowed the farmers to exploit the potential of natural resources, for example, of wildlife (Lindsay  et al. 2013; Lenggenhager  2018).
Thus provisioned by the state, white landowners invested their profits in infrastructure that allowed them to reap continuous profits from the land. The climatic
and geographic conditions affecting most privately-owned land in Namibia made livestock farming unviable. Even the production of the much sought-after pelt
of  the  Karakul  sheep ─  considered as  one of  the  most  profitable  uses  of  the  arid  land ─  relied on substantial  financial  support  from the South African
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with respect to the tourism industry ─ began during German colonial times, when large stretches of land were demarcated as hunting reserves. Such areas had
multiple functions in the spatial organisation of the colony. Game Reserve 2, today known as the Etosha National Park, in particular, acted as a buffer zone in
the north and as a stock-free zone for veterinary purposes (Miescher  2012,  pp.  160-166;  Dieckman  2007).  Further,  game reserves  were used from their
inception to maintain game populations to secure their reproduction. In this way, a steady supply of huntable wildlife could be guaranteed (Dieckmann 2007, pp.
74–77;  Carruthers 1995). In the 1950s, the Etosha Park was declared a national park and its few remaining inhabitants, who were still allowed because they
worked partly as game guards and acted as an auxiliary police force, had to move out. Shortly thereafter, the national parks, particularly Etosha, became crucial
for the development of tourism, which had its first small boom in the 1960s. Although this tourism was mostly in the form of organised camping tours for white
Namibians and South Africans (and a few Germans), farmers around Etosha began to build small infrastructural facilities for travelling parties (Breitwieser
2016 ).
An incentive by way of changing wildlife legislation in a way that made it profitable for white farmers to shift their focus to wildlife and tourism was the second
South African intervention. In 1961 the South West African Administrator Daan Vilijoen made this clear when he pushed for tourism development in the
country.  “Of  all  the  sights  worth  seeing on the  globe,”  Daan Vilijoen noted,  “animals  still  remain the  most  remarkable,  and of  them South West  Africa
fortunately has no lack” (SWA Annual Report 1961, p. 3; see also Breitwieser  2016). To allow private farmers to get their share of the income from wildlife and
tourism, the South African regime granted property rights over wildlife to white owners of private farms in the late 1960s.  Prior to that wildlife was seen as a
common  good,  even  when  found  on  private  lands.  The  new property  rights  were  granted  on  the  assumption  that  the  commodification  and  privatised
conservation of wildlife would provide farmers with an opportunity to earn a profit through hunting, the sale of live game, game meat production and tourism.
The apartheid government deemed the introduction of this legislation a success as many cattle farmers diversified their business by taking to game farming and
tourism. This not only raised the profits of the tourism industry, but also brought about an increase in the number of economically useful animals on private
farms. The transfer of wildlife ownership from the white-minority state to white landowners led to “increases of both the number of animals and the economic
productivity of wildlife as a form of land use” (Nelson 2010, p. 9).
These two interventions during the apartheid period, that is, the development of national parks as major tourism attractions, and the granting of ownership rights
over wildlife to farm owners, resulted in the repurposing of former farms into land for tourism, recreation, hunting conservation and other such purposes. This
became popular in South Africa and Namibia in the 1980s, and is so even today (Reed and Kleyhans 2009, Spierenburg and Brooks 2014, and Kamuti  2018).
With the change in land use, the perception of the white farmer also changed. At a time when many white farmers in Southern Africa realised that they might no
longer be able to uphold the system of white rule, they re-invented themselves successfully as conservationists and stewards of the land. This new role is not
only more profitable, but also less negatively loaded. And, as we show in this paper, it prevented their land – and the profits therefrom – from becoming part of
any redistribution.
One of the earliest examples of such repurposing in Namibia is a small cluster of farms close to Otjiwarongo, a town about 250 km north of Windhoek. The
owner turned his farms into a private game reserve in 1961.  He later sold his farms profitably, and the new owners took over the game reserve. Till today these
farms remain successful tourism businesses. For most farm owners, however, wildlife tourism was only a small share of their income before Independence.
Nevertheless, it allowed them to gain the experience, knowledge and contacts that enabled them to seamlessly move their business towards wildlife and tourism
after Independence.
With Independence in 1990, Namibia’s tourism figures grew rapidly and became an important contributor to the country’s national income.  Many farm owners
began or expanded tourism and conservation businesses on their land. With the reduction of the massive state subsidies for commercial farming, it became even
more important for farmers to diversify or to sell their land to investors. Shortly after Independence, international and national companies began buying up
farms for conservation and tourism use. A prominent case in point is the Gondwana Collection Namibia. As early as 1995, Gondwana began buying up freehold
farms close to the Fish River National Park in southern Namibia in order to develop them as private game reserves and lodges. This allowed the farmers to get
capital  out of their land after years of drought when intense grazing and the shortfall  of  state subsidies rendered cattle production unprofitable.  Today,
Gondwana is one of the largest providers of high value tourism accommodation in Namibia, and one of the largest private landowners.
Housing Estates
As in the case of wildlife tourism, which entailed the conversion of old freehold commercial farms obtained during colonial and apartheid times, the conversion
of  farms  into  housing  estates  around  urban  areas,  especially  around  Windhoek,  allowed  a  few  people  to  make  significant  profits.  Examples  of  these
developments can be found in the residential developments outside Windhoek, and along the major road connections to other parts of the country. In 1974, the
proclaimed municipal area of Windhoek was about 4730 hectares. By 1996, this had increased to 8237 hectares (Windhoek Municipality 1996), which included
some of farms close to the town that had been converted into valuable townland. In 2011, the government gazetted another extension of the boundary of the
municipality of Windhoek, creating space for the establishment of housing estates on former farmland. The owner now had to pay land taxes to the municipality
and observe the regulations that governed municipal land, for example with regard to building laws, land use regulations, or hunting (Nakamhela Attorneys
2012 ). However, nothing changed with regard to land ownership. As a report by the government in 2012 made clear, tax rates were to stay the same, and in
cases  where ongoing businesses  were negatively impacted,  the new regulations wouldn't  be applied at  all,  as  for  example on hunting farms (Nakamhela
Attorneys  2012). In other words, owners of these farms still had the full bundle of rights on land, but land that was now valuable urban land rather than
unproductive and unprofitable farm land. This also allowed them to sell small plots of lands for high prices to buyers and developers.
As illustration for such and similar processes, take the newly established housing estates around Windhoek: Elisenheim Lifestyle Village, Omeya Golf and
Residential  Oasis,  and Finkenstein  Estate.  All  of  them are  located  less  than 30  kilometres  from Windhoek’s  city  centre.  The  development  of  Elisenheim
Lifestyle Village began in 2005 with the acquisition of the farm Elisenheim (1,186 hectares) by a local investor. The farm was allocated to white farmers during
German colonial times and its name can be traced back to 1896. After acquisition in 2005, part of the land was re-zoned for residential development and
officially launched in 2010.  The plan for  the estate included residential  plots,  churches,  schools,  a  business  and commercial  zone.  Marketed as  “Namibia’s
Premier  Family  Estate,”  a  similar  housing  estate  was  established  in  2005  south  of  Windhoek,  also  on  former  commercial  farming  land.  It  envisaged  a
development of nearly 400 residential units, 14 townhouses, a retirement village, a care-centre, a private school, and an 18-hole golf course. Finkenstein Estate,
on the former Finkenstein farm, boasts another 222 residential units, with individual owners holding one hectare of land each.
All three estates were developed on former commercial farmlands, the investors taking advantage of the increasing demand for serviced land and housing in
Namibia, in particular its biggest urban centre of Windhoek. The demand for serviced land and housing exceeds supply – in 2016 there was an estimated
shortage of  100,000 housing units  nationwide (Shaningwa  2016).  People have taken advantage of this situation,  often described as a “housing crisis,”  and
converted land close to Windhoek from commercial farmlands into much more lucrative housing estates. Alternatively, they have sold their farms or parts of
them to real estate developers. Though the houses built on these estates are out of reach for most Namibians, the investors nevertheless promote their business
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market. This is also in line with the Government's drive to provide housing to Namibian citizens” (Elisenheim Lifestyle Village Estate 2015). Considering the
history of non-performing farmlands in the past, this is an attractive way of generating money out of the land.
There are other dynamics within which these new conversions are to be understood. When the City of Windhoek expanded its boundaries in 2012 to include,
among others, Omeya and Elisenheim, the city aimed at “clamp[ing] down on ‘upper-class’ residential estates mushrooming on the outskirts of the city” (Duddy
2011). These estates were viewed to be enclaves of the rich, and in particular, of formerly advantaged racial groups in Namibia. Their existence was therefore
seen as perpetuating the polarisation between Blacks and whites, and the rich and poor – the hierarchies that form the main legacy of the apartheid era, and with
which Namibia is still grappling today (Morange et al.  2012). Housing estates pay taxes to the municipalities, while owners of commercial farmlands pay taxes
to the land reform ministry, taxes that are further reinvested in the land reform programme. This also means that commercial farmland that has been re-zoned as
townland is no longer available for redistribution through the commercial land reform process, and that therefore the taxes coming from these lands do not
directly go into the land reform programme anymore.
Making Money on Communal Land
The commercialisation of agricultural land in Namibia is not only confined to freehold land, but is increasingly prevalent in communal land areas. Communal
land, areas that were once subsistence-level holdings, and were used as labour reserves and places to keep “non-productive” population groups, today sees the
dynamics and compulsions of commodification (Nghitevelekwa  2020). Attempts to turn land into capital in the communal areas started in the 1960s as a result
of the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission mentioned above. Following the Commission’s recommendation, the apartheid administration established
small-scale commercial farming units in selected communal areas. These units were seen as “potential sites of capital accumulation” (Werner 2015, p. 72). In
the implementation of its plans, the government made it clear that these small-scale farms were meant to convert the subsistence economy in selected communal
areas into an exchange economy, with land as the key economic asset. This was to be done by means of individualisation (through fencing) of large tracts of
land, thereby creating small-scale farming units from land formerly used as communal pastures.
Investment  in  infrastructural  development  such  as  fencing  and  borewells,  and  individualisation  of  tenure,  were  preconditions  for  the  promotion  of
commercialisation  (Werner  2015).  This  process,  which  started  during  apartheid  times,  continued  till  well  after  Independence.  After  the  introduction  of
communal land reform in 2002, these areas were designated for agricultural purposes whereby landholders, consisting of the old rural elite and new urban rich,
were granted long-term leases for up to 99 years.
Since Namibia’s independence, international and national investors have become increasingly interested in Namibia’s communal land. They are particularly
interested in the extraction of timber for the Asian economies, and in long-term leases for the production of tobacco. It was only recently that a Canadian
company got the rights to oil exploration on communal land (Nghitevelekwa, forthcoming). Namibian investors have also found lucrative opportunities on
communal land by entering into partnership agreements with traditional authorities or community-based conservation organisations. Tourism companies not
only focus on acquiring freehold commercial land, but have also found opportunities on communal land on which they have entered into joint ventures with
community-based  institutions  to  develop  enterprises  for  high-value  tourism.  Recently,  a  joint  venture  between  a  tourism  company  and  King  Nehale
Conservancy established the Etosha-King Nehale Lodge in northern Namibia. In this case, the investors used their access to capital, global networks, new forms
of individualisation of land rights on communal lands, and of course, the Etosha National Park itself, the main attraction for visitors.
All these developments show that even though the government of Namibia correctly restricted the large-scale privatisation of communal land, this has not been
enough to prevent an accumulation of land and profit in the hands of a few. Furthermore, the past few years have seen the development of illegal land markets
on communal land (Mendelsohn and Nghitevelekwa 2017). While according to the communal land reform act, buying and selling land in the communal areas is
legally prohibited, in practice, land markets are in existence and have become part of the mechanism through which people get access to communal land. This
practice is  particularly widespread in densely populated areas,  along the main arterial  roads and in peri-urban areas.  Through these illegal  land markets,
communal land is becoming a tradable good – outside of any governmental control and taxation system. This practice has been left to run its own course. One
explanation for such a laissez-faire  approach is the inability or unwillingness of the traditional authorities and the government to control the illegal practices that
hold great potential for some of the parties involved. Under customary systems, access to land has been given by the traditional authorities in Northern Namibia
for a small “transaction” fee, that covered the administrative work of the traditional authorities (40 USD). Today land transactions between land holders may
amount to USD 5,000 for less than two hectares of land. This new possibility of making money out of land is changing the dynamics around land use and the
power structures underlying tenure systems on communal land. Access to land is therefore increasingly granted to those able to pay the highest price.
Local land users take advantage of the increasing demand for land by subdividing their landholdings into small parcels which they trade-off in exchange for
money  (Nghitevelekwa,  2020).  Thus,  access  to  land  is  becoming  increasingly  commodified  and  involves  active  land  speculation  (Mendelsohn  and
Nghitevelekwa  2017).
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we showed the diverse forms in which capital accumulation in Namibia was, and is, linked to land ownership. Because the landownership regime
in Namibia has been established under unequal, racist, colonial and apartheid conditions, its society still struggles with extreme inequality in land and wealth
distribution. On commercial land, many of the original white owners of the farms have long taken out the money from their land through selling or leasing of
the land for more profitable businesses such as tourism, conservation or housing. Others made use of their privileges, strong financial positions and power
networks to invest heavily on their farms, turning them into lucrative businesses. The commercial land reform introduced since Namibia’s Independence has
thus far not tackled these issues, and is focused more on the redistribution of often not very profitable land than on redistributing land and what came with it:
power, money and access. As we have shown, in a highly arid and thinly populated country like Namibia, the value of arid land can only substantially increase
when backed by factors such as government incentives and subsidies, capital investment, infrastructure, proximity to towns, and the presence of natural or
aesthetic attractions. Many of the (former) land owners have capitalised successfully on these privileges long ago, and are now no longer affected by any effort
by the state to redistribute land.
Further, since Independence, communal lands have gained more public and academic attention (Bloemertz et al.,  2021, Nghitevelekwa  2020, Mendelsohn et al.
2017 ,  and Werner  2018b).  Here again,  there is  a  danger of  understanding the land question as  detached from the conditions under which land becomes
profitable. A careful analysis of land and the access to land shows that also on communal land subsistence agriculture is no longer the main source of land-based
profit generation. Instead, also on communal lands, the possibilities of making money on land depend on the existence of commercial opportunities or housing
needs along the main roads.
The current governance system has failed to ensure equal access to land and income-generating opportunities for all sections of society. As recent developments
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show, none of the measures taken so far has been able to provide full protection from inroads made by large investors, such as the Canadian mining company
that got access to large stretches of communal land for oil exploration and extraction. To conclude, the common perception that the commercial land reform or
the reorganisation of communal land systems in Namibia can make up for past injustices or will solve the unequal distribution of wealth today is misplaced.
Other forms of redistribution of wealth, and the provision of security of tenure that minimises the risks of misappropriation, will have to be considered more
seriously.
NOTES
 1 For an updated overview of literature on the genocide, see the 2016 third edition of: Zeller et al. (2003), pp. 263–268.
 2 Except with a special Government permit, one that was hardly ever granted.
 3 On the impact of the Odendaal commission in the northern communal areas, see Werner (2018); on the North-West, Bollig (2013); and on the North-East, Lenggenhager (2018) .
 4 Agribank of Namibia (n. d.) .
 5 Bernard C. Moore (2021)  shows that financial support for fencing was particularly important because in the very South of Namibia there was a shortage of labour. Once the farms were
fenced in, much less labour was needed to guard the animals from predators.
 6 Despite its important economic value, there are surprisingly few research studies on tourism on commercial land in Namibia. For a general overview of European tourism to Namibia in
the 20th century, see Breitwieser (2016) ; on the economic expectations of commercial farmers in tourism after independence, see Jänis (2009) ; on economic development and tourism in
the 1980s and 1990s, see De Jager/Barnes (1996) ; and on hunting tourism, see Samuelsson and Stage (2007) . On local tourism, see Henrichsen (2000) . More generally, there is research on
private wildlife conservation and tourism in Southern Africa, for example, Bond et al. (2004)  and Carruthers (2008) .
 7 Through the 1960s and 1970s the South African government promoted tourism as a way of income generation, even for the homelands.
 8 E.g.: Interview of CB by the authors, August 23, 2012, Windhoek; see also Jones (2010), p. 108. Other sources indicate that this law was introduced in 1975; see Owen-Smith (2010), p.
540.
 9 There was a division of wildlife into different categories. While the categories played a crucial role in the respective hunting regulations, the categorisation was not relevant when it
came to property rights over animals.
 10 The granting of ownership rights over wildlife was economically so successful that independent Namibia extended a similar system to communal lands through the famous communal
conservancies (Lenggenhager 2018 ).
 11 His application for the establishment of a game park dates from January 15, 1960, and the appointment as game warden on his own land dates from September 15, 1961 (pers. comm.
from his son, 2014).
 12 The most recent data (from 2017) shows that tourism and travel in total (indirectly and directly) contributed close to 14 per cent of Namibia’s GDP. That share and is expected to grow
further (World Travel and Tourism Council 2018 ).
 13 Gondwana Collection (n.d.) .
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